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A SOCIOLOGY OF SCIENCE APPROACH TO 
UNDERSTANDING INDIGENOUS PSYCHOLOGIES 
WilliamK. Gahrenyajr. 
Florida Institute of Technology 
Melbourne, U.S.A. 
In this chapter I discuss several conceptualizations of indigenous psy-
chology movements and identify some critical issues and challenges with 
which research on these movements must contend. I do not address the 
intellectual agenda of the movements; instead, I take the role of a sociolo-
gist, uying to understand the course of a scientific discipline as an encl in 
itself. I will touch on five broad topics, each briefly. 
• How can we look at the movements in a sociological manner? I 
suggest several models and present some supportive data. 
• Who can and who may study these movements' Who has the requi-
site authority and who has the right? 
• How is indigenous psychology rearranging the specialties of social 
science? 
• What is the effect of national wealth in the development of indig-
enous psychology' 
How do we know when there's progress? 
Some research results will be presented in a cursory fashion. This 
paper is intended to stimulate thought and to bring some controversial 
topics to the fore more than to present these ideas and issues in a fully 
developed form. For a more detailed discussion of these issues, please 
refer to Gabrenya (in preparation-a; in preparation-b). 
The Sociological Approach 
My approach to understanding indigenous movements focuses on the 
social, organizational, political, and societal aspects of the movements 
rather than their intellectual content, except to the extent that this content 
is itself a source of data. The approach is essentially sociological: "sociol-
ogy of science" (SoS), outsider analysis of the movements. In my use of 
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SoS, I'm interested in three phenomena: First, the career of the psycholo-
gist, conducted within an academic community and a societal setting; 
second, the dynamics of social movements that guide and constrain ca-
reers; and third, the effect of societal and situational characteristics on the 
intellectual activities of the academic researcher. One could say that this is 
a very "cold" approach to the problem in its reduction of the career strivings 
of many of our colleagues to mere data (much as we treat our research 
subjects). Cold as the approach may be, at the outset I would like to 
express my greatest respect for the work of indigenous psychologists and 
my view that their movements make positive contributions to the field. 
The Sociology of Science, also tenned Social Studies of Science and 
sometimes Social Psychology of Science, attempts to understand science, 
here indigenous psychology, as a social phenomenon occuning in a particu-
lar time and place, and does not concern itself with the validity of the 
intellectual argument. We are not concerned with who is right and who is 
wrong, or indeed if anyone in social science is making real progress. (Of 
course, progress is always desirable.) SoS, broadly, looks at science in a 
societal context, focusing on how societal processes and events affect the 
direction, speed, and in some accounts, content, of science. It also looks 
closely at the career dynamics of individual scientists, their motivations, 
lifestyles, personalities, reward structures, positions in the social stratifica-
tion system of the society (e.g., gender and ethnicity), social networks, 
career paths, and educational experiences (cf. Ben-David, 1981; Cole & 
Cole, 1973; Cole, 1992; Merton, 1973; Restivo, 1994; Shadish & Fuller, 1994; 
Zuckerman, 1988) 
Unfonunately, SoS itself encompasses sharply contrasting approaches 
to science that generally fall on the same dimension that cross-cultural and 
cultural psychologists always argue about: relativism (Zuckerman, 1988). 
In this context, the universalists are often called "realists" because they 
believe that there is a real, natural world d1at scientists gradually reveal 
through research and analysis. The speed at which various branches of 
science progress, the wrong turns, the distribution of face and favor among 
scientists, and so on, are viewed as socially or culturally determined, but 
fundamentally there is something real to be discovered. Wrong turns will 
eventually be straightened out d1rough good scientific practice. 
The relativists are social constructionists who believe to va1ying de-
grees that science is a social product influenced by social and cultural 
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processes (e.g. Restivo, 1994). Since the constructionists are themselves 
social scientists researching science, they proceed to deconstruct their own 
research as well, rendering their activities "doubly relativist" and outside 
of our concern in the present paper. 
The difficult problem for even a realist approach to indigenous psy-
chology is that social science is often considered less "paradigmatic" than 
natural science in the Kuhnian sense (Kuhn, 1970), and the realism-con-
st:ructionism problem is strikingly more problematic. The implication of 
this problem is that it is very possible that a SoS of indigenous psychology 
might take several steps beyond not caring if the content of the movement's 
ideas are right or wrong. For example, it might assume from the start that 
both itself and all social science are at least partially wrong (at least at 
present). However, regardless of the validity of the intellectual content of 
the field, my interest in this research is in indigenous psychology as a 
social phenomenon. 
Five Paths to Indigenous Psychology 
I have developed a series of process models that describe "paths" 
through which indiv.idual psychologists and national communities of psy-
chologists become progressively more indigenous at ideological, behav-
ioral, and organizational levels. My research in Taiwan has been aimed at 
trying to find support for selected components of these models. I am a 
cultural materialist (Harris, 1979, 1999), and I view the situation of work-
ing scientists as an ecological niche to which they must adapt in order to 
survive and thrive. These models rely heavily on the situational constraints 
of careers. In its strong form, this approach argues that ideological or 
intellectual products spring from these ecological concerns and then per-
haps exert an autonomous influence on the course of the movement. 
These models are discussed here very briefly; for a more complete expla-
nation and a description of the empirical research, see Gabrenya (in prepa-
ration-a; in preparation-b). Indigenous psychology movements may be 
facilitated through any combination of the five paths; no single path can be 
assumed to be necessary or sufficient. 
The Localirrel.evance Path 
Indigenous movements complain that Western psychology is irrel-
evant to their local cultural milieus (e.g., Enriquez, 1997; Kim & Berry, 1993; 
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earned. 
Naidoo, Olowu, Gilbe1t, & Akotia 1999; Pe-Pua & Protacio-Marcelino, 2000; 
Sinha, 1997; Yang, 1993, 1997a, 2000). This complaint is certainly one of 
the key intellectual arguments of the movements, but of interest here is the 
felt experience of the academic psychologist. I argue that Western-trainee! 
psychologists experience four kincls of i1Televancy in their work when they go 
home to a non-Western count1y, and that this experience motivates, in 
part, the exploration of indigenous thinking. Locally-eclucatecl psycholo-
gists have many of the same experiences, and are socialized to local dis-
ciplinary norms. First, the topics that were studied in Western graduate 
schools (or published in Western journals) may seem silly and unimpor-
tant, especially in areas like experimental social psychology. Second, the 
methods taught in Western graduate programs may be difficult to use 
given local resources, or tied to topics that are themselves out of place. 
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Third, the Protestant ideology of Western science may feel discordant with 
local ideologies, and the arguably rigorous and remote methodology of 
neo-positivist, quantitative research may seem irrelevant. Finally, the lan-
guage of graduate training, such as English, may present conceptual prob-
lems in dealing with local people and culture, and practical challenges to 
publishing and communication with Western colleagues. 
Research in Taiwan provided various types of evidence supporting 
these ideas. A sample of 103 Taiwanese psychologists participated in a 
mail survey that addressed each of the models described here. (See 
Gabrenya, in preparation-a, for details of the research.) For example, we 
asked respondents if their main topics of interest in graduate school, and 
presently, could be investigated using empirical methods tl1at are com-
monly used in Western psychology. The relevance of Western empirical 
methods varied as a function of respondents ' field (social, experimental, 
clinical, applied),"1{3, 83) = 6.72,p< .05, of whether we were referring to 
their graduate school or current research, J{l, 83) = 6.03, p < .05, and of 
whether they received tl1eir doctoral degree in Taiwan or in the West, J{l, 
83) = 4.91, p < .05. The results show tl1at respondents in the three non-
experimental fields have come to see Western methods as less appropri-
ate, and that Taiwanese-trained psychologists feel this way more than 
Western-trained psychologists. (See Figure 1.) 
Conditions of Work Path 
The Conditions of Work path hypothesizes that several characteristics 
of an academic employment situation affect career activities and goals, 
such as the expectations and resources of the university, teaching loads, 
t11e imp01tance of and support for publishing, and certain outside, societal 
factors. In many non-Western nations, these situational factors present 
contingencies that differ from those that returning Ph.D.s experienced while 
in Western graduate schools, and a satisfying career in line with the expec-
tations and goals acquired in graduate school may be unattainable. Some-
times indigenous programs offer more obtainable expectations, and a ca-
reer can be redefined. This sort of problem may in fact be faced by every 
academic who is trained in a research university but then must find a 
career in a teaching university or very small school 
Two measures in our survey study addressed this problem. We asked 
respondents to evaluate me quality of the resources available in Taiwan 
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compared to what they thought was available in the West. The overall 
assessment was ve1y negative: 77% of respondents rated Taiwan below die 
midpoint of the scale, and 43% chose the lowest scale value. We also 
asked respondents the extent to which working far from the West makes 
it difficult to keep current in their field, and found a similar result. Only 
25% claimed it was easy or very easy to keep cutTent. This problem 
appears to be more serious for younger faculty; a moderate relationship 
was found between year of degree and difficulty, ,;,6, = .41, p < .0001. 
Nationalldentity Path 
Participants in indigenous psychology movements are keenly aware 
of the political and academic domination of Europe and America and 
evidence various degrees of resentment of this situation. They also realize, 
as some citation research has illustrated (Gabrenya, 1988b), that Western 
psychologists generally ignore the theory and research coming out of non-
Western countries, and do so because of a misguided universalism, or 
more seriously, a misguided "absolutism" (Adamopoulos & Lonner, 1994; 
Lonner, 2000). Out of this situation, given sufficient societal resources, we 
might expect the development of a movement to establish a psychological 
identity in its own right, independent of Western ideas and dominance. No 
one likes to be ignored. 
Our su1vey of Taiwanese psychologists included four items that formed 
an index measure of this felt need for identity and recognition. Social, 
clinical and applied psychologists indicated a need for identity (Ms= 3.88 
to 3.99 on a 5-point scale), whereas experimental psychologists tended not 
to (M= 2.79), R..3, 87) = 6.78,p< .001. Throughout mis research, experimental 
psychologists showed a preference for a universalist, natural science con-
ception of psychology that usually precluded indigenous thinking. 
The Great Leader Path 
The familiar Great Man versus Zeitgeist debate returns in the present 
context. It appears that most of the extant indigenous movements have (or 
had at their inceptions) strong leaders whose ideas and influence ap-
peared instrumental in the movements' progress. A SoS analysis examines 
the impact of these leaders and asks difficult questions such as what will 
become of the movements after these leaders become less active, even if 
the cultural milieu supportive of indigenous movements continues. 
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Some indirect supp01t for the importance of leadership was found in 
our research. Our respondents were asked to nominate a leader of the 
Taiwan movement, and among respondents who answered these ques-
tions, about 90% chose the eminent psychologist Kuo-Shu Yang as the 
movement's intellectual as well as organizational leader. I interpret this 
high consensus as an indicator of strong leadership. 
Social Movements 
Indigenous movements appear to share many of the defining traits of 
social movements (McAdam, McCarthy & Zald, 1988; Snow & Oliver, 
1995): ideology; charismatic leadership; members who share personal 
motivations for participation; resources; social or material control over 
members; a supportive milieu; a sense of identity that is tied in part to 
what they are against and in part to what they hope to change. Adopting 
a social movem~nt perspective allows us to understand the development 
of indigenous psychology as a truly social phenomenon. 
We would expect that one accomplishment of a successful academic 
social movement would be control of critical resources such as grant fund-
ing and faculty positions. We asked our respondents if their research 
needed to be ''indigenized"' in order to be funded locally. Respondents 
from all fields reported that they needed to indigenize for funding (Ms = 
3.5 to 3.7) with the exception of experimental psychology (M = 2.2), R3, 
66) = 7.0, p < .001. Among experimental psychologists, 20% reported some 
degree of need to indigenize (endorsing scale responses "neutral, some-
what needed, very much needed") while among the other three field 
groups, 84% reported such a requirement. 
Wealth: The Sixth Path 
From a SoS or a social movements perspective, we should look at the 
intersection of wealth and other factors in predicting when an indigenous 
movement will appear. The development of psychology may run parallel 
to the development of democratic political institutions, both appearing 
and prospering under favorable economic conditions in the context of 
societal modernization. In the same manner that democracy requires the 
development of "civil society," indigenous psychology may depend for its 
development on the achievement of a certain level of "psychological infra-
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structure": sufficient Ph.D. psychologists, faculty positions, research oppor-
tunities, social acceptance, and so on. Psychology is an expensive activity 
and, like art, it "follows the money" (Sarason, 1981). Since the lifting of 
martial law in 1987 Taiwan certainly provided these prerequisite condi-
tions for democracy and indigenous psychology, and both have flourished 
(Marsh, 1996). Korea has followed a similar course. Understanding the 
complex mechanisms--economic, social, and psychological-through 
which wealth affects cultural change in general, and the development of 
indigenous movements in particular, requires a societal-level analysis. 
Cognitive Ecology 
Restivo 0994), following in the tradition of Adam Smith, Marx, and 
Veblen, suggested that "what [scientists] do is more an outcome of the 
pressure of the situation they are in than of what they have earlier 'inter-
nalized'" (p. 106). His concept of "occupational culture" (common tasks, 
work schedules, job training, career patterns) applies readily to the situa-
tions of psychologist working in different nations. "Cognitive ecology" 
refers to situational influences on the ideas of the working scientist, analo-
gous to an ecological niche but emphasizing the effect of the niche expe-
rience on intellectual activity such as metatheories, epistemological orien-
tations, theories, and values. Situations might be viewed in a hierarchical 
structure beginning at the scientist's academic depamnent and the courses 
he or she teaches and extending up or out to the zeitgeist or weltanschauung 
of his or her time and place. Even in an "era of unprecedented information 
overload" the load is not evenly balanced and what the psychologist 
experiences intellectually and ideologically day to day reflects more the 
nature of his or her social and scientific community than of all the ideas 
extant in the discipline (especially in a global context). The situations 
described in the five paths discussed previously in this chapter also repre-
sent much of the substance of the cognitive ecological niche of the psy-
chologist. 
A strong version of this ecological argument holds that psychologists 
can't think too far beyond the ideology and intellectual content of their 
cognitive ecological niche, whereas a weak one would suggest a more 
distal or multiply determined influence. Both versions suggest that Ameri-
can psychology's slowness in understanding the importance of culture can 
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be explained by the monocultural experiences afforded psychologists 
working in a large, insular, effectively monocultural nation.' For example, 
my informal obsetvation of the field suggests that people don't choose 
cross-cultural psychology because they come to a careful assessment of its 
value based on a full intellectual review; rad1er, they have experiences 
mat wrench mem from the cognitive ecology of d1e mainstream. 
The cognitive ecology of a Western graduate program can be ex-
pected to constrain thought, and of course action, along the lines of West-
ern psychology in a myriad of ways, including explicit contingencies placed 
on students, d1e depa11ment's value system, and the kinds of experiences, 
coursework, and ideas to which mey are exposed. Most psychologists will 
not deviate from this ecological constraint unless something happens d1at 
"reorients their cognitive ecology." PhDs returning from Western graduate 
programs to non-Western countries are by necessity subject to a transfom1-
ing experience_:mey go home. The cognitive ecology they experience 
upon return is different than that of their graduate training and differs from 
me cognitive ecology experienced by those of their graduate school peers 
who made d1eir careers in the West. Beyond simply a matter of irrel-
evancy, a different way of thinking about psychology might be expected, 
perhaps influenced by the processes desc1ibed in the other models out-
lined previously. 
Who Can and May Study These Movements? 
TI1e implicit assumption made in this chapter so far has been that the 
author has the right to perform this research and has the authority (in the 
academic sense) to present his findings to an audience of his peers. Al-
though in science the writer's c.v. should suffice as the source of his or her 
scientific aumority, in me present context the issue of aumority is compli-
cated by the persistent insider-outsider debate. We ask, who can and may 
study me indigenous movements of others? 
"Can" and "may" are different ideas. "Can" begs the question of what 
we are capable of knowing; '·may" of what we are allowed to do. Not 
unlike and1ropologists, cross-cultural psychologists have an ongoing, dif-
ficult, awkward, maybe exploitative, relationship with the "other" that we 
hope to figure out. In anthropology, the post-modern debate rages as to 
whemer we can ever know me "other" and if so, how our research can be 
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sufficiently grounded, intersubjective, emic, relative, and so on, to ap-
proach an understanding of the other (D'Andrade, 2000). For these rea-
sons, some Anthropologists have concluded that tl1ey cannot study the 
Otl1er, while for ethical or political reasons some feel that they may not. 
However, I know of no writing by indigenous psychologists that directly 
claims tl1at outsiders may not study their movements. But the same might 
not be true for can. 
My experience, so far, has been that insiders to an indigenous move-
ment cast a cold eye on outsiders who are peeking in. From an epistemo-
logical perspective, these movements take a skeptical stance in tl1eir evalu-
ation of outsider, etic, cross-cultural strategies in general (e.g., see Kim, 
2000). Compounding the metl10dological objection, outsiders studying 
indigenous movements are also famously ill-informed and possibly dis-
ruptive. We are ill-informed because we are outside the cultural, aca-
demic, and national systems in which the movements develop (Yang, 
1997b). Sometimes we cannot speak or read the language in which our 
data (textual anifacts) are written. (The writings coming from within the 
movement are the data for studying it from without, but only if the outsider 
can read them). Our work is, some might say, "shallow." A similar critique 
has been made by cultural psychology of cross-cultural psychology (see 
Hwang & Yang, 2000; Yamaguchi, 2002). However, I argue that this is 
both a weakness of which we have long been aware, and a strength if etic 
research strategies are valued. I suggest that outsider perspectives are botl1 
(a) always shallow and (b) a necessary complement to insider perspec-
tives. Antl1ropologists not associated with tl1e post-modern movement have 
long recognized tl1e value of outsider perspectives: 
" ... a century of fielclwork has proven that it is the outsider who is able 
to aniculate cultural practices that are invisible and commonsensical 
to insiders" (Fiske, 2002, p. 85). 
This is a year of ironies in the world, and the insider-outsider problem 
has its own. Much of tl1e ideological content of indigenous psychologies 
begins witl1 a two-pronged critique of Western psychology: first, of its 
validiry for studying cultures outside the West, and maybe for studying its 
own culture, too; and second, of its motives in studying non-Western 
peoples and in studying non-Western psychologies. However, tl1is critique 
of Western psychology is itself performed from an outsider perspective. 
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Phrased slightly differently, indigenous psychologies could be viewed as 
taking an outsider perspective in criticizing Western psychology, including 
its sins, as an outsider. uoutside" is a relative assessn1ent, and it is true that 
many non-Western social scientists have lived in tl1e West and studied 
Western psychology, while the opposite is less common. It is difficult to 
assess the extent to which these social scientists, living briefly in the West 
as young foreign students, really come to understand Western culture in 
sufficient depm. To use me central term of Taiwanese indigenous psychol-
ogy, the non-Western critique of Western psychology can never achieve 
bentu qi-hexing, indigenous compatibility wim the research subject (K. S. 
Yang, 1997b; but see C. F. Yang, 1997, for an opposing point of view), 
because those performing the criticism can never share the perspective of 
tl1e subject. Taken at face value, tl1is state of affairs leaves all sides inca-
pable of bentu qi-hexing and highly limited in their research prospects. 
However, I believe that both insider and outsider research present useful, 
mutually balancing perspectives. For example, the outsider critique of Wes-
tern Psychology has been shallow and unfair, but at the same time very 
effective in calling to Western psychologists' attention our bad habit of per-
fomling culturally uninfonned "imposed etic" research "by 747" (Doob, 1980).2 
Disruptive Outsiders 
Outsiders who study indigenous movements are disruptive in the 
same sense as any anmropologist hanging around a tight commurlity and 
asking awkward questions. One is reminded of Napoleon Chagnon's (1968) 
. experience among me Yanamamo. We know what he experienced and 
what he found, but we don't know how much trouble he caused in Bisaasi-
teri village. In my own research on t11e Taiwan indigenous psychology 
movement, I encountered considerable reluctance among my research 
subjects, sometin1es of me form, "here's what I tl1ink but please don't use 
my name because I want to keep my job." I eventually learned, for ex-
ample, that I could get more survey data by having it mailed back to 
Florida tl1an to my research assistant in a Taiwan university. But the other 
side of tl1is reluctance was d1at I found myself in a role not unlike Chagnon's, 
a confidante or outsider to whom "mings could be said" to the extent that 
I was trusted to keep secrets or maintain anonymity. I was careful with my 
database of field notes. 
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As an outsider/foreigner studying a controversial social movement, it 
is difficult to make anyone happy. Members of the movement assume you 
are engaged in a Western-biased attack on their work, and critics of the 
movement suspect you are trying to support people who they believe are 
wasting precious grant money. Members have their own internal conflicts 
(e.g., see Hwang, 1997; Yu, 1997) and some are insecure about the status 
of the movement; non-members are worried about being seen as outside 
the movement. The result is, of course, insecurity on the part of the re-
searcher, frustration, a sense of being in over one's head, and a pervasive 
feeling that social psychology was never this mysterious. 
The Fish Scale Model 
Donald Campbell, a brilliant psychologist who cross-cultural psychol-
ogy (and several other areas) can call one of its own, wrote in the field of 
SoS. His "fish-scale model of social science" suggests another way to look at 
indigenous psychology. Campbell argued in this 1969 paper that academic 
specialties are like overlapping fish scales, and academic fields are collec-
tions of scales. The collections are not completely arbitrary but their bound-
aries were determined in the past by various historical processes in the 
context of Western universities. Once a field, like psychology, is estab-
lished through the collection of adjacent scales or specialties, processes of 
group dynamics, occupational socialization, chauvinism, and academic 
political economy (competition for resources) come into play that gradu-
ally bring the specialties closer to the central values, beliefs, and behaviors 
of the field. The field, transmitted at ground level through the experiences 
and contingencies of being in an academic department, produces a proxi-
mal component of the cognitive ecology that I discussed previously. 
Individual scientists working in "deviant" specialties within the disci-
pline have a difficult time getting respect, promotions, and resources, and 
in the encl have to make hard choices that involve their career aspirations 
and feeding their families.' Campbell argued that the chauvinism and 
organizational politics of disciplines impairs communication between ad-
jacent specialties that happened to fall into different disciplines (e.g., cross-
cultural psychology and psychological anthropology), and this is a prob-
lem for social science. I think we experience this all the time in our own 
work, as I have argued elsewhere (Gabrenya, 1988a). 
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Indigenous psychology (and probably cultural psychology) seems to 
be attempting to redefine psychology by rearranging the scales, placing 
specialties that now fall in psychology and anthropology into the same 
field. For example, much indigenous work has adopted variants of the 
ethnographic field methods of anthrnpology and utilizes the theoretical 
material of philosophy and cultural studies (e.g., Hwang, 2001). Of course, 
this violation of boundaries makes everybody angry, because d10se at the 
center of d1e field (read: experimental psychology) can't appreciate the 
way the deviants at d1e periphery (read: cultural psychology, indigenous 
psychology, cross-cultural psychology) are thinking and acting. 
Does Progress Matter? 
I have stated that the Sos approach doesn't care if the actual products 
of the disciplines.or specialties under examination are scientifically right or 
wrong. But in fact, if one takes a realist point of view, one could include 
"progress" as a valid object of study. So how do we know if indigenous 
psychologies are making progress in their own cultural domains or if they 
contribute to d1e progress of world psychology? In Taiwan, K. S. Yang 
frequently cites various indicators of progress (e.g., see Yang, 1997a), but 
he is concerned with the progress of a social movement as much as, and 
possibly more than, simply scientific progress. The reader will recognize 
the old issue: is social science progressing? In the American pragmatic 
tradition, we would say that progress is indicated when something works 
to solve a real problem. Unfortunately, the content of much indigenous 
work, at least in Taiwan, can't be evaluated that way because it takes a 
highly d1eoretical, sometimes ethnographic, style. However, one domain 
of indigenous activity in Taiwan can be scrutinized from the criterion of 
pragmatism-applied psychology. Applied psychology must be effective 
in the local cultural context, or else it disappears; it is indigenous, or it is 
gone.' In my Taiwan research, I found d1at the applied psychologists 
shared many indigenous beliefs and attitudes-their appr-disal of positiv-
ism, acceptance of indigenous psychology, etc.-with social psychologists, 
in sharp contrast to experimental psychologists. 
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Conclusion 
My concerns in this chapter focused on whether the SoS approach is 
useful, whether my models are valid, and whether or not we can actually 
perform this research using each other as "subjects" without causing the 
kinds of problems that make life as an academic unpleasant. I proposed a 
set of models to describe the paths along which psychologists in non-
Western societies may travel in their journey from an imposed Western 
psychology to an indigenizecl, local psychology. The models are ecologi-
cal or materialist in two senses: the development of indigenous psychol-
ogy is viewed within the social and economic "ecological setting" of the 
greater society; and the scientific thinking and creativity of the psycholo-
gist is viewed within the "cognitive ecology" of the immediate work situ-
ation and larger cultural milieu. 
Sociology of science presents a way of thinking that is at once familiar 
to psychologists trained in the etic traditions of theoretical, universalise 
research, but at the same time alien in its greater distance from the subject 
and its disinterest in the validity of the subject's activities and products. 
This way of viewing the field is not completely unfamiliar to cross-cultural 
psychology, as evidenced by the several citation analyses and overall 
appraisals of the field that have appeared over the years (Doob, 1980; 
Gabrenya, 1988b, 1997; Lonner, 1980, 1994; Onge! & Smith, 1994). How-
ever, to my knowledge, the domain of activities-the development of 
disciplines, the behavior of incliviclual psychologists---0n which the SoS 
analysis focuses is much broader, more difficult to quantify, more ame-
nable to multiple interpretations, and ultimately more controversial than 
any previous research of which I am aware. 
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Notes 
1 Although America is a multicultural society, I suggest that the experi-
ences of psychologists are much more monocultural than those of psy-
chologists outside the United States: "Even the rat was white" (Guthrie, 
1997). 
2 Extending this irony, I argue that the outsider critique by cultural psy-
chology aimed at its aging parent, cross-cultural psychology, has been 
shallow, unfair, and in the end the best thing to happen to cross-cultural 
psychology since Hofstede's first book (Hofstede, 1980). 
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3 This is why it's so hard to get a good job doing cultural or cross-cultural 
psychology. We all are working in specialties that are deviant from the 
central perspective of modern psychology. 
4 Lin (2000) illustrates dramatically the failure of an insufficiently indigenized 
clinical psychology to respond to the mental health service needs of 
victims of the 1999 Taiwan earthquake. 
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